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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT			
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FEDERAL OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTION  
OF THE CONSTITUTION  
IV A 1 - 104-A-03001-5/69 VS-Vertr

5 Cologne, 16 May 19

Monthly Report No 4

Results of Counterespionage in April 1969

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A. General Survey

In April 1969, the BfV recorded a total of 53 persons who had been approached for the purpose of completing intelligence assignments directed against the Federal Republic.

Assigning Services:

48 persons were approached by Soviet Zonal intelligence services  
3 persons were approached by Soviet intelligence services  
1 person was approached by a Czech intelligence service  
1 person was approached by a Hungarian intelligence service

Above contacts were established in the following years:

1945	( 1 )
1956	( 1 )
1957	( 1 )
1958	( 1 )
1961	( 1 )
1963	( 1 )
1964	( 3 )
1965	( 4 )
1966	( 3 )
1967	( 6 )
1968	( 28 )
1969	( 3 )

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B. Legal Resident Agencies of Soviet Intelligence Services  
in the Federal Republic

The Soviet intelligence services are maintaining operational bases at all official Soviet agencies in the Federal Republic. There are the following Soviet agencies in the FRG:

- o Embassy of the USSR,  
Rolandseck, Koblenzer Strasse 28
- o Trade Mission of the USSR,  
Cologne, Aachener Strasse 240-44
- o SOWFRACHT (Ship Freightage State Office),  
Hamburg 63, Wellingsbuetteler Landstrasse 267
- o SOVAG (Black Sea and Baltic Sea Transportation Insurance Company),  
Hamburg 22, Schwanenwik 37.

Press Agencies:

- o TASS - Bonn, Heussallee 2-10, Pressehaus I
- o PRAWDA - Bonn-Venusberg, Kiefernweg 20,  
branch office: Frankfurt/Main
- o TRUD - Bad Godesberg, Austrasse 12  
(trade union paper)
- o EKONOMITSCHESSKAJA GASETA (financial paper),  
- Bonn, Robert-Koch-Strasse 16
- o RADIO MOSCOW - Bad Godesberg, Brunhildstrasse 11.

The Soviet Military Missions (SMM) in the Federal Republic also are intelligence bases. They had been set up in accordance with agreements between the victorious powers of World War II in the former

- o US occupation zone in Frankfurt/Main,
- o British zone in Buende,
- o French zone in Baden/Baden.

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The Soviet agencies in the Federal Republic employ about 210 persons, among them 50 SMM members. This figure does not include dependants and those Soviet nationals who come to work at a Soviet agency for a short period ("acceptance engineers").

Between 50 and 60 percent of the personnel of official Soviet agencies belong to legal resident agencies of the Soviet intelligence services KGB and GRU (two thirds are KGB members, one third GRU members). The intelligence officers occupy permanent established posts that are reserved for KGB and GRU members but given out as regular duty jobs by the individual agencies.

Such procedures and the diplomatic status offer excellent cover and protection. Any counterintelligence activity against the resident agencies is further handicapped because the persons to be observed have been trained in many years of thorough 'intelligence studies'. The diplomatic agencies - the intelligence officers' strongholds in the FRG - offer an ideal operational basis. The SMM members hold a special status and enjoy the privileges laid down in article II of the Germany Treaty. Accredited to the commanders-in-chief of the armed forces stationed in Germany they hold a quasi extraterritorial status. They may move about freely in areas of the former occupation zones. However, the armed forces stationed in Germany have set up restricted areas (military installations) in regions that they are responsible for, which may be entered by members of the military missions only on special conditions.

Only the Soviet Embassy personnel and the manager of the Soviet Trade Mission as well as his three deputies hold an extraterritorial status. Yet, those privileged persons are not the only ones who are engaged in intelligence activity. There are numerous examples that members of Soviet agencies who are subject to German jurisdiction handle agents in the Federal Republic. A member of the Soviet Trade Mission whose name was PRIPONZEV had been active as handling agent. In 1962, he was sentenced to four years imprisonment at hard labor by the Federal High Court. The former SOVAG chief in Hamburg, KOPITSCHEN, also handled an agent. Warned by the Soviet agent FELPE he was able to evade arrest.

PRIPONZEV  
Valentin  
Aleksandrovich

Dmitry Ivanovich

Heinz

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The KGB members in the Federal Republic conduct joint actions, no matter where they are stationed and to which agency they belong.

This became evident in the case of SCHPAGIN, member of the Soviet Trade Mission. SCHPAGIN had handled a German agent. He had been supported (protection of meetings, clearing dead letter drops, etc) by the following ones:

TASS correspondent JAKOWLEW, ~~Radio Moscow correspondent~~ ~~the trade mission members~~ ~~SARITSCHENKO~~ and Albert M. KUSNEZOW, and the Soviet Embassy members OSSIPOW and SELJUTIN.

The KGB resident agency in the Federal Republic had been headed last by 'Botschaftsrat' (Counsellor of Embassy) ~~WOLNIZOV~~, who had been killed in an accident in Cologne ~~on 25 February 1969~~. His predecessors also had held the rank of Counsellor of Embassy and had acted as chiefs of the political section.

The personnel of the KGB resident agency is composed of office of the 1st Main Directorate. Their tasks include:

- o collecting information on internal and foreign political events and on scientific and technical projects;
- o penetrating western intelligence services (Counterespionage)
- o supporting illegal resident agents (RUNGE, etc);
- o disinformation
- o vetting and penetrating emigrants' groups;
- o protecting the Soviet agencies in the FRG.

It is the GRU agents' chief task to vet military and military-technical installations. In many cases, however, their activity overlaps with that of KGB agents; they, too, handle sources having access to military material.

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The members of the Soviet military missions are GRU members for the most part. They are not subject to systematic observation by German authorities but come under the responsibility of the counterespionage organs of the western allies. Main targets of the SMAs' vetting activity are military installations in the FRG as well as troop movements of the Federal Armed Forces and its western allies. In times of political tension (CSSR crisis, etc) they will intensify their vetting activity considerably.

The KGB agents are responsible for security matters. They may interfere in GRU cases which they believe to be recognized or endangered.

The members of legal resident agencies of the KGB and GRU have undergone an excellent training. Some of them have an outstanding scientific and technical knowledge. The methods of legal resident agencies regarding the recruitment of agents have been pointed out repeatedly in other connections. Generally, the Soviet agents will establish first contacts to persons of interest to the intelligence service at social events or at business talks. It is remarkable, however, that years may go by from the establishment of relations to the recruitment and that no official pledge for cooperation will be demanded. Frequently, first talks concerning the recruitment will take place in the Soviet Union. For this purpose, the person to be recruited will be invited to "business talks" in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet intelligence members display great activity in the vetting of prominent personages of public life. Apparently, "overt" vetting actions are concerned. The partner in a conversation unconsciously serves as vetting target.

This method is all the more effective as the danger of premature discovery is very small and the establishment of all kinds of contacts with West Germans a 'normal event'.

There is a group of Soviet nationals who work at the Soviet Trade Mission in Cologne for a period of three years at the most. Their activity is worth mentioning because there is reason to suspect that those persons ("acceptance engineers" according to the visa entry) are official members of the Soviet Trade Mission in Cologne.

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Thus, the Soviet Trade Mission probably increases its number of personnel which is restricted to 60 persons. According to their statements at border control offices, those persons want to test machines etc at West German industrial firms; part of them live at apartments rented by the Soviet Trade Mission. Generally, they do not appear at the mentioned firms at all or work there only for a short time.

According to experience, the "acceptance engineers" complete as many intelligence assignments as the official Trade Mission personnel. They work under almost ideal conditions: In their capacity as unofficial members of the Soviet Trade Mission they are authorized to move about freely in the FRG because they are not liable to notification. For this reason, it is extremely difficult to control the activity of those "acceptance engineers"; if at all, this can be done only at a great expense of observation personnel.

Some "acceptance engineers" are stationed at the Soviet Trade Mission in Cologne, some stay in other West German cities. At present, a total of about 230 "acceptance engineers" are active in the Federal Republic.

C. Defector of the Soviet Intelligence Service

On 11 April 1969, the KGB member Rupert SIGL came to West Berlin.

Since the latter part of 1953, SIGL had been active for the East Berlin KGB office. It had been his chief task to approach and recruit agents on behalf of the Soviet intelligence service; besides, SIGL also handled agents himself.

His vetting activity was directed against NATO countries, first of all against the United States. SIGL made several trips to the Federal Republic and to other western countries. He had the following cover names:

Kurt HAGER  
Peter KLEIN  
Heinz BERND  
Dr. Gerhard REICHERT.

In 1961, SIGL became naturalized in the "GDR".

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SIGL was born in Austria on 12 April 1925. He said that he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence service in Austria in 1947. He had worked there in the Soviet occupation zone until 1952. On 12 December 1952, SIGL participated in a predatory attack in Lower Austria, allegedly on behalf of the Soviet intelligence service. After the attack, he fled to the Soviet-occupied part of Austria from where he was taken to Moscow by air.

OUT USSR Austria

The KGB deserter Nikolai KOKHLOV made statements regarding SIGL in 1958. He pointed out that SIGL had been working for the Soviet intelligence service since 1951 and that he had been given the cover name "FILIP". Asked about the predatory attack, KOKHLOV stated that SIGL had acted wilfully and for lucre. From talks with a KGB colonel KOKHLOV had learned that SIGL had told his handling office that he had intended to furnish proof of his qualification as a terrorist. Accused with regard to possible

In 1953, KOKHLOV had been ordered to handle SIGL. After having studied photostat copies of the court records on the trial against SIGL he had refused this task because he had considered SIGL an unreliable agent. In Moscow, SIGL was given another handling agent.

SIGL received a thorough intelligence training. According to his statements, he was taken over as a full-time KGB coworker in 1953.

Based on SIGL's statements, four persons were arrested in the Federal Republic, one person in Belgium. They are:

o HACKENBERG, Heinz, born in Dresden on 31 Dec 1922,  
residing Reinbeck, Friesenweg 3;

Accused with regard to Arrested FDR  
In early April 1969, HACKENBERG volunteered for cooperation with an intelligence service in the Soviet Zone. As an engineer (deep workings) HACKENBERG knew details about Federal Armed Forces construction projects (fuel dump installations etc.).

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POHLE, Horst Hans Wilhelm  
born in Berlin on 12 Mar 1932,  
residing Berlin 20, Spektaweg 50,  
waiter and mechanic.

When visiting his aunt in Erlau/Soviet Zone in 1965,  
POHLE was recruited by the Soviet intelligence service.  
From July 1966 to February 1967, POHLE has been employed  
as driver by the US Consulate-General in Frankfurt/Main.  
His handling officer had ordered him to furnish reports  
on employees of the Consulate-General. When POHLE  
quitted working there he was dropped by the KGB. POHLE  
denied maintaining intelligence contacts.

MIRCHANDANI, Lisette, nee MAHLER,  
born in Berlin in about 1930,  
residing Hanau, Fahrstrasse 7,  
Ceylonese citizenship, commercial agent  
in paintings.

Frau MIRCHANDANI, who used to work for the Soviet Zonal  
television program committee, was recruited by the MfS  
in 1953 and handed over to the KGB in 1960/61.  
In 1962, Frau MIRCHANDANI (she was single at that time)  
was asked by the KGB to marry the Ceylonese businessman  
MIRCHANDANI; the KGB wanted this marriage because it  
would enable her to move to the West "legally".  
In the long run, Frau MIRCHANDANI was to be introduced  
into diplomatic circles for the purpose of recruiting  
persons of interest to hostile intelligence. Frau  
MIRCHANDANI was handled by SIGL from 1961 to 1963.  
She admitted maintaining contacts with the Soviet  
intelligence service until she was arrested.

SCHULZ, Guenter Friedrich Albert,  
born in Berlin on 7 Feb 1932,  
residing Berlin 41, Zimmermannstrasse 25,  
electrician.

In 1959, SCHULZ moved from East Berlin to West Berlin  
for financial reasons. His wife remained in East Berlin.  
During a visit in East Berlin, SCHULZ was questioned about  
his contacts with "flight helpers". He was told to collect  
information on nightclubs and restaurants frequented by  
Americans. He was to establish contact with those Americans,  
vet their apartments and furnish information concerning  
their acquaintances and friends. Finally, SCHULZ was to  
write down the licence numbers of vehicles entering the  
barracks area at Finckenallee. He reported to SIGL at meeting  
in East Berlin. He admitted working for the intelligence  
service.

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o v. WESENDONK, Franz,  
born in Berlin on 21 Oct 1916,  
last residence: Drewe, Nivelles/Belgium.

v. WESENDONK was a member of the European Common Market Secretariate (liaison office to other European institutions) until October 1968. Since then he has been habilitating at Saarbruecken University.

v. WESENDONK had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence service while a POW in Russia. After his return to the Federal Republic he attended several meetings with his Soviet handling officer "VIKTOR" in Vienna.

v. WESENDONK was told to finish his law studies at first. In the following time he maintained contact with several Soviet handling officers. Since his employment at the Common Market Secretariate in 1958, WESENDONK has been informing his handling office on

- o the situation within the Common Market,
- o the consequences of Common Market politics to Communist countries,
- o the efforts for association of countries of the 'Third World'.

Meanwhile, the warrants of arrest issued against HACKENBERG, POHIE and SCHULZ have been put out of force. Frau MICHANDANI is still under arrest. v. WESENDONK came to the Federal Republic soon after his arrest in Belgium. In the FRG no warrant of arrest was issued against him.

The investigations will be continued.

D. Deserter: of the Czech Intelligence Service (StB)

On 18 April 1969, Metoděj SOCHOR, captain of the Czech intelligence service, reported to the police in Frankfurt/Main. He had come to the FRG on behalf of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade. Since 1958, SOCHOR had been a member of the Czech counterintelligence service. He belonged to the 2nd Administration (SPRAVA) of the StB, Aussig. At first, SOCHOR was to instruct and question Czech nationals traveling to or returning from the Federal Republic. Later on, he was to observe members of the British Embassy in Prague. In March 1968, SOCHOR was detailed to work at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. His StB membership was kept secret.

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Ct. Czechoslovakia Associated with Motodis SOCHOR

Based on SOCHOR's statements, the Czech agent Franz HLUSICKA was arrested in Duesseldorf, on 7 July 1968. HLUSICKA and his family had moved to the FRG. Prior to his move to the West, HLUSICKA had been given intelligence assignments directed against western intelligence services. HLUSICKA said that the StB member Josef KYRAL had been his first handling officer in Aussig. A warrant of arrest was issued against KYRAL who had been working at the SEMEX Company in Dorsten/Westphalia from 1961, with interruptions. SEMEX, among others, represents the Czech foreign trade organization MOTOKOV in the FRG. KYRAL was an official member of this organization.

Ct. Czechoslovakia

W. GERMANY

Associated with Motodis SOCHOR

The BFV had already received information on KYRAL's intelligence activity.

HLUSICKA and KYRAL were taken into investigative custody.

certified correct:  
/s/ SCHUMACHER, employee

/s/ Dr. NOLLAU

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